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In recent years, the literature commenting on Amartya Sen's work has been flourishing. His so-
called Capabilities Approach (CA) in particular continues to attract considerable attention from so-
cial scientists across different disciplines. Sen's (1984: 509f) proposal, that “economic development 
is best seen as an expansion of people's capabilities”, has contributed to an emerging change in the 
development paradigm, shifting the focus from mere economic growth to questions of agency and 
well-being. Furthermore, the approach has had important practical implications on the policy level, 
most notably, its role in the creation of the Human Development Index published annually by the 
United Nations Development Program. While Sen's CA is being widely recognized, his earlier aca-
demic work is often ignored. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to investigate Sen's intellectual ori-
gins. The particular focus lies on the methodology used in his contributions to social choice theory.
The overall interest in this research topic is motivated by a rather casual observation about the 
reception of Sen's work. Formulating the CA, it seems, Sen managed to move beyond the estab-
lished boundaries of a strictly economic approach. Moreover, he remains one of the most highly re-
spected scholars in the economic discipline, while at the same time numerous scholars in different 
fields of development studies greatly value Sen's work. As Atkinson (1999: 189) puts it: “What is 
remarkable is that Sen, in his forays into philosophy, has sharpened the questions being asked, with-
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Sen's CA appears unusual as it stands in contrast to recent imperialist endeavors of economic rea-
soning; embodied most prominently by Gary S. Becker (1976).
1
This paper suggests the following hypothesis: Sen's work in the field of welfare economics tes-
tifies of methodological schizophrenia.
2 Throughout his work on social choice theory, he simultane-
ously displays both, compliance as well as noncompliance with mainstream economic methodology. 
His treatment of methodological issues, displaying multiple distinct scientific identities, appears 
contradictory at first. However, a comprehensive investigation of Sen's economic thought during 
this particular period of his academic career hints at how methodological tensions have led to his 
subsequent work in the field of development.
To begin with, the task of testing this hypothesis requires a definition of the key concepts used: 
mainstream economics and methodology. To simplify matters, I suggest to equate the mainstream of 
economic thought with the neoclassical approach. This seems reasonable as neoclassical methodol-
ogy constitutes the »hardcore« of economic orthodoxy and, moreover, the point of departure for the 
imperialist expansion of economic reasoning. Sen's adaptation, respectively his critique, of a num-
ber of selected components of mainstream methodology will be illustrated throughout the paper. 
With regard to methodology, two basic usages of the term can be distinguished. First, economic 
methodology is concerned with the practical techniques employed by economists in their research, 
second, economic methodology focuses on the underlying aspects of knowledge production (Hands 
2001: Chap. I). Hence, in aiming for a methodological appraisal of Sen's work, the scope of this pa-
1 Lazear (2000: 103) defines economic imperialism as “(...) the extension of economics to topics that go beyond the 
classical scope of issues (...). The most aggressive economic imperialists aim to explain all social behavior by using 
the tools of economics. Areas traditionally deemed to be outside the realm of economics because they do not use 
explicit markets or prices are analyzed by the economic imperialist.” Becker (1993) himself replied to the allegation 
of economic imperialism by defending the need for an expansion of the horizons of economics: “Economists can 
talk not only about the demand for cars, but also about matters such as the family, discrimination, and religion, and 
about prejudice, guilt, and love. Yet, these areas have traditionally received little attention in economics. In that 
sense, it’s true: I am an economic imperialist. I believe good techniques have a wide application”.
2 For the sake of terminology, it has to be noted that the correct psychiatric diagnosis that describes a condition in 
which a single person displays a number of different personalities is dissociative identity disorder. However, as this 
condition is colloquially referred to as schizophrenia, and as Sen (1970b: vii) himself incorrectly employs the 
metaphor, the term schizophrenia is used in this paper.
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techniques and assumptions leading to the formulation of scientific knowledge are scrutinized.
The exercise of tracing back the origins of Sen's economic thought is twofold. On the one hand, 
it requires an examination of his earlier work. On the other hand, it poses the question whether Sen's 
methodology is consistent throughout his career. And, if so, is it possible to identify a coherent evo-
lution in his thought? The focus of this paper lies with the former task. The conclusion, however, 
suggests a particular view on Sen's earlier work that might serve as a possible starting for more 
comprehensive investigation.
The tensions mentioned in the hypothesis are already apparent in Sen's academic biography. 
Having received his training in economics as well as philosophy, he has contributed to debates on 
welfare economics and issues of legal and moral philosophy in equal measure. At Harvard Universi-
ty, Sen was both Professor of Economics and Professor of Philosophy. Beyond the personal level, it 
seems worthwhile to scrutinize Sen's academic writing with regard to methodological schizophre-
nia. Due to the sheer magnitude of his publications,
3 I will focus on a number of selected writings 
on social choice theory.
The paper at hand is not concerned with the logic of scientific discovery (Popper 1957) or the 
the structure of scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1962). Nor does it try to identify a Lakatosian hardcore 
and protective belt in mainstream welfare economics. (However, where fit, some of these concepts 
are being referred to.) Rather, the paper starts from a constructivist premises: Economics is what 
economists do. Hence, economic methodology can best be observed in its application. Mainstream 
methodology is constituted through actual research of mainstream economists. To that effect, the 
3 A a twelve-page, single-spaced bibliography of Sen's works, published by the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
(1999: 191-203), lists the following topics: social choice theory, welfare economics, economic measurement, 
axiomatic choice theory, rationality and economic behavior, economic methodology, studies of famines, gender 
inequalities and family economics, growth theory, economic development, project evaluation and cost-benefit 
analysis, education and manpower planning, labor and employment, the Indian economy and society, social, 
political and legal philosophy, ethics and moral philosophy.
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ly held to be part of a conventional research program.
In order to further exemplify the concept of the paper at hand, Hands' (2001: Chap. V) compila-
tion of six characteristics of constructivist approaches in the field of sociology of scientific knowl-
edge (SSK) is useful. Firstly, social constructivism has a strong hands-on aspect, i.e. it contains de-
tailed studies of scientific practice. Secondly, studies tend to be very local and case-specific, situat-
ed at one particular side of knowledge production. Thirdly, constructivist approaches generally do 
not start from tight priors, the framework of analysis tends to be negotiated, contingent and context-
sensitive. Consequently, and fourthly, very little is seen as fixed and almost everything is open to 
negotiation. This negotiative flexibility implies that scientific knowledge is the product of an ongo-
ing, continuous and radically contingent dialogue among scientists within a set of institutions. Fifth-
ly, nature plays little or no role in the production of scientific knowledge. Finally, all of these fea-
tures add up to a debunking of the unique cognitive privilege that is generally attributed to the tradi-
tional Western philosophy of science. Science is not an autarkic (non-discoursive) body of universal 
laws that merely needs to be revealed, but rather a social environment in which agents work, inter-
act, negotiate, and thereby ultimately create not only scientific knowledge but simultaneously a con-
cept of what is considered to be scientific.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section introduces the recent construction of Sen as 
a »compleat economist« by briefly sketching out the core concepts of the CA as well as by summa-
rizing a number of frictions the approach has created within economics and other disciplines of de-
velopment studies. In the second section Sen's contribution to social choice theory is introduced in 
order to map the content, the scope and the context of his earlier work. The following sections in-
vestigate Sen's publications in this field with respect to a number of particular methodological is-
sues: formalism and axiomatic method, ontology and methodological individualism, and the ratio-
nality postulate. The last section summarizes the results and concludes.
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Instead of describing the evolution of Sen's economic thought chronologically, this sections be-
gins with a presentation of his later works. It looks at how Sen is constructed as an exceptionally 
comprehensive economist and argues that this is largely due to the perception of the CA as provid-
ing a holistic approach to development.
The immensely wide thematic scope of Sen's work, in conjunction with his philosophical 
thought, has led to his characterization as being a “compleat economist” (Atkinson 1999: 187). A 
similar comment is made by Arrow (1999: 172): “(...) the area where Sen's contributions have been 
truly unique is his extraordinary synthesis of economic and philosophical reasoning (...). No one has 
combined different approaches, formal analysis, conceptual clarification, theory of measurement 
and empirical work as Sen”. When Sen was awarded the Noble Prize in Economics for his contribu-
tions to welfare economics in 1999, the press release of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 
emphasizes his achievements in the following way:
“Amartya Sen has made several key contributions to the fundamental problems in welfare economics. His 
contributions range from axiomatic theory of social choice, over definitions of welfare and poverty 
indexes, to empirical studies of famine. (...). Sen has clarified the conditions which permit aggregation of 
individual values into collective devisions, and the conditions which permit rules for collective decision 
making that are consistent with a sphere of rights for the individual. By analyzing the available 
information about different individuals' welfare when collective decisions are made, he has improved the 
theoretical foundation for comparing different distributions of society's welfare and defined new, and 
more satisfactory indexes of poverty.” (RSAS 1999: 157)
While the CA receives only little mention in the context of the Noble Price, Sen's ostensible 
personification as a »compleat economist« stems to a large extent from the general reception of this 
contribution. In the broadest sense, the CA can be viewed as a conceptual framework for comparing 
different social states in terms of freedom. Further, it contains implications for the understanding of 
development, which is characterized by Sen (1999a: 3) as “(...) a process of expanding the real free-
doms that people enjoy”. The expansion of freedoms can be seen as being synonymous with an ex-
pansion of people's capabilities (Sen 1984: 509).
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tional welfare economics (income, goods, and utilities). First, the term functioning is introduced by 
Sen (1999a: 7) in order to evaluate the social state of a person: “A functioning is an achievement of 
a person: what he or she manages to do or to be”. Functionings thus are both different from as well 
as related to the possession of goods and the achievement of utility. They follow from the entitle-
ment over the former and precede the later. Put simply, functionings represent the actual outcomes 
or achievements of a person's actions. As such, a set of functionings can represent the complete bi-
ography of a person. Secondly, entitlements refer to “command over commodities” (Sen 1999a: 9) 
based on production or exchange. Production entitlements refer to how a person produces goods 
and services and the resulting control over her output for the purpose of consumption and reproduc-
tion. Exchange entitlements refer to rights to control commodities in monetized or barter forms of 
exchange. Thirdly, capabilities “are valued ultimately because they reflect freedom, including, inter 
alia, the freedom to achieve happiness” (Sen 1983: 512). Given the personal features of an agent 
(conversion of commodities into functionings) and her command over commodities (entitlements), 
freedom can be seen in terms of available choices over different functionings (Sen 1999a: 9). While 
functionings denote the actual life a person leads, capabilities refer to the alternative functionings 
she can potentially attain or, put differently, the extent of her positive freedom.
“The freedom reflected in the capability set can be used in other ways as well, since the value of a set 
need not invariably be identified with the value of the best – or the chosen – element of it. It is possible to 
attach importance to having opportunities that are not taken up. This is a natural direction to go if the 
process through which outcomes are generated has significance of its own. Indeed, choosing itself can be 
seen as a valuable functioning (...)”. (Sen 1999b: 76)
This approach focuses on the substantive freedoms that people have in terms of choice, instead 
of the particular social states which they achieve eventually. From this perspective, poverty implies 
a deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely a lowness of income. While Sen (1999b: 92) 
acknowledges that relative deprivation in terms of income can yield absolute deprivation in terms of 
capabilities, he repeatedly criticizes the “commodity fetishism” inherent to mainstream economics. 
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rather than their value being derived from what people can do with them. In the process of develop-
ment, expanding supplies of commodities certainly is of importance, however, ends and means 
should not be confounded.
A closer investigation of recent comments on Sen's CA reveals several frictions in the generally 
positive attitude towards this approach. In academic practice, the CA is faced with the balancing act 
of satisfying the strict criteria for a rigorous economic research program as well as the non-reduc-
tionist cognitive interest of a broad social science perspective. Pressman & Summerfield (2002: 
431) note in this regard that inside of economics the alleged vagueness of the framework has led 
graduate students' advisors and reviewers for journals to reject research proposals and papers based 
on the CA due to a lack of formal modeling. Conversely, from outside the discipline, Sen's approach 
has been labeled as “(...) primitive in some ways, insufficient as a theory of well-being, and hardly a 
theory of the 'human' in human development” (Des Gasper 2002: 436). Similar frictions have 
emerged on the policy level. The human development approach, after meeting first with irritated re-
sistance, followed by a phase of enthusiastic acceptance, has entered a phase of critical evaluation 
(ul Haq 1998: 228). Some voices express concern that the production of the Human Development 
Reports has been dominated by the CA and by contributions of economists such as Sen, Mahbub ul 
Haq, and Paul Streeten. Resonating this distrust towards the CA, critics such as Apthorpe (1997), 
conclude that the reports' abstracted sense of human – in combination with its commitment to eco-
nomic growth – merely represent a more human economic development, rather than development of 
and by humans.
The above critiques indicate the well-known conflictual relationship between economics and 
social sciences. However, they do not contradict the predominately positive reception of Sen's CA 
in the mainstream of development theory. Certainly, this is due to the fact that the CA is perceived 
as making the case for a holistic understanding of development in terms of the expansion of free-
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societal spheres, such as markets, political organization, various kinds of institutions and moral val-
ues. Having said that, it is not necessarily implied that he also commits to a methodological holism
4. 
In the following, the methodology of Sen's contribution to social choice theory is therefore consid-
ered, inter alia, in relation to the principle of complexity reduction prevalent to mainstream eco-
nomics.
2. Collective Choice and Social Welfare
This section presents the content and the scope of one of the key areas of Sen's earlier work: the 
subject of social choice theory. For Sen (1998: 178) social choice theory is concerned with the prob-
lem of arriving at aggregative judgments about different social states given the diversity of individ-
ual preferences, concerns and predicaments. A subfield of welfare economics, social choice theory 
aims to provide cogent explanations for basing collective choice and social welfare decisions on the 
preferences of the individual members of a society. A great deal of work on social choice theory, in-
cluding Sen's contribution, has been motivated by Arrow's (1951) “General Possibility Theorem”, 
which showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orderings into a social order 
while satisfying certain conditions.
5
One of Sen's most prominent earlier writings, »The Impossibilty of the Paretian Liberal«, can 
be seen as being part of this research program of social choice theory during the late 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s. The article presents an impossibility result – sometimes also referred to as the »liberal 
paradox« – that demonstrates the impossibility of a social choice satisfying even a minimal demand 
for liberty when combined with an insistence on Pareto efficiency.
4 With regard to scientific methodology, the idea of holism was discussed, among others, by Quine (1975) in terms of 
the interconnectedness of scientific beliefs. Hands (2001: 99), more generally, uses the term to describe the idea that 
scientific knowledge constitutes an interrelated web in which no theory stands alone. However, as mentioned above, 
this paper refers to methodological holism as an antonym for reductionism.
5 Arrow (1951) considers the following conditions: Pareto efficiency, non-dictatorship, independence (demanding that 
social choice over any set of alternatives must depend on preferences only over those alternatives), and unrestricted 
domain (requiring that social preference must be a complete ordering, with full transitivity, and that this must work 
for every conceivable set of individual preferences).
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presents several highly formalized steps developing and, eventually, proofing the impossibility re-
sult. Sen begins with a number of definitions: collective choice rule, social welfare function, and so-
cial decision function. Next, he introduces the conditions of Unrestricted Domain (U), Weak Pareto 
Principle (P), and Liberalism (L) as the criteria against which the (im-)possibility of social decision-
making is tested. Sen (1970a: 153) concludes: “There is no such social decision function that can 
simultaneously satisfy Conditions U, P, and L”. This presentation of the formal result is followed by 
a rather vivid example illustrating the implications of theorem. The article concludes with a brief 
discussion on the implications of the obtained impossibility theorem, which Sen (1970a: 157) de-
scribes as follows: “While the Pareto criterion has been thought to be an expression of individual 
liberty, it appears that in choices involving more than two alternative it can have consequences that 
are, in fact, deeply illiberal”.
6
Within the field of social choice theory, Sen's article can be regarded as an instance of normal 
science in the Kuhnian (1962: 36) sense, as it “(...) is achieving the anticipated in a new way”. 
Moreover, in being consistent with the methodological components of Arrow's original impossibili-
ty theorem, »The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal« contributes to the problem-solving charac-
teristic to normal science. While conditions (U) and (P) are adopted by Sen as well as Arrow, the re-
quirement for Minimal Liberalism (L*) replaces Arrow's condition of non-dictatorship. As the for-
mer is a stronger requirement than the latter, the axiomatic exercise gives a more robust result.
7
At first glance, irregardless of the obtained result, the article appears to be in line with the sci-
entific framework of mainstream social choice theory. In terms of content, scope and overall 
methodological procedure, Sen's impossibility result is far from being unconventional. A closer ex-
6 Arrow (1999: 166) recognizes the results for pointing out the profound moral question on the relation between the 
remnants of utilitarian philosophy as contained in the Pareto principle and the existence of individual rights in a 
liberal tradition, calling for a a scope (however small) over which the individual has complete control. Furthermore, 
Sen's result has sparked both a technical literature, for instance Gibbard (1974) and Suzumura (1978), and provoked 
follow-up philosophical contributions to his conception of rights, for instance Nozick (1974) and Dworkin (1978).
7 Moreover, Sen relaxes the condition of liberalism, to a condition of Minimal Liberalism (L*) and restates his 
theorem as follows: “There is no such social decision function that can simultaneously satisfy Conditions U, P, and 
L*” (Sen 1970a: 154). This theorem is stronger and therefore subsumes the original case.
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istic of Sen's methodological schizophrenia.
3. Axiomatization and Complementarity of Formal Methods and Informal Reasoning
Formal ways of representing and producing knowledge, in particular the mathematization of 
models, constitute a key element of mainstream economic thought. Accordingly, Rosenberg (1994) 
describes economics as a branch of mathematics on the intersection between pure axiomatization 
and applied geometry. Critics of this development, such as Woo (1986), remark that formalism in 
economics has developed up to a point where only knowledge that is expressed in mathematical 
form – or even better, knowledge that is obtained purely through mathematical reasoning – is con-
sidered respectable.
Regarding the article outlined above, the presented impossibility result strongly relies on a 
mathematical logic of relations. At the same time, however, the relevance and the implications of 
the argument put forward are discussed at length in a predominately non-formal way. This discus-
sion takes the form of an anecdotal illustration of two individual's attempting to come to terms with 
H. D. Lawrence's novel »Lady Chatterly's Lover«. Sen develops the example as follows. Mr. A, be-
ing relatively prude, prefers that no one reads the book (c) to reading the book himself (a),  which 
he prefers to anyone else reading it (b). A rather lascivious Mr. B on the other hand prefers reading 
the book himself to the book not being read by anyone. However, he would take the greatest satis-
faction in Mr. A. having to read the book. Put shortly, Mr. A prefers c to a and a to b, while Mr. B 
prefers a to b and b to c. For Mr. A, a liberal argument, reflecting the idea that his own preference 
should be represented in the social preference ordering (condition L*), given the choice between a 
and c, would require that the book simply should not be read by anyone. Likewise, the same argu-
ment implies for Mr. B that, faced with the choice between b and c, society should allow Mr. B to 
read the book instead of it being banned. However, in terms of the Pareto principle, Mr. B reading 
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Hence, due to the conflict between conditions (L*) and (P) every alternative appears to be worse 
than another.
Having outlined the concurrence of formal axiomatic reasoning and verbal discussion in Sen's 
article, a closer look at his monograph »Collective Choice and Social Welfare« helps to better un-
derstand his attitude towards these two distinct ways of producing and presenting knowledge. Here, 
Sen presents a similar impossibility result, »The Liberal Paradox«, in two separate sections. Like-
wise, the volume as a whole is divided into two different kinds of chapters, half containing formal 
analysis, half containing verbal analysis. While one of the so-called starred chapters presents the 
theorem purely in mathematical terms, a corresponding unstarred chapter discusses the conditions 
of Liberalism, Unrestricted Domain, and the Pareto Principle in verbal form.  Interestingly enough, 
Sen comments on this choice of presentation himself in the introduction of the monograph.
“A nontechnical reader can get an intuitive idea of the main arguments form the unstarred chapters. 
However, for precise statement of results as well as proofs, the starred chapters have to be read. The 
partitioning of the book into formal and informal chapters is a stylistic experiment. Many problems of 
collective choice require a rigorous and formal treatment for definiteness, and informal arguments can 
indeed be treacherous, but once the results are obtained, their meaning, significance and relevance can 
be discussed informally. In fact, a purely formal discussion of significance would be unnecessarily 
narrow. The book attempts to cater to two distinct groups of readers, viz., those who are primarily 
interested in the relevance of the results rather than in their formal statement and technical derivations, 
and those who are also concerned with the latter.” (Sen 1970b: vii)
Even though Sen attempts to portray the composition of the book as a mere stylistic issue, i.e. a 
matter of presenting his results to readers with different interests, the passage suggests a particular 
methodological position regarding the role of formal reasoning in the process of knowledge produc-
tion. It seems, new and cogent insights to collective choice theory for Sen require rigorous math-
ematization. While verbal interpretations of the obtained results are needed for discussions on rele-
vance and implications, the analytical engine driving the creation of new knowledge appears to be 
axiomatic formalization. Three decades later, Sen commented on this issue again in his Noble lec-
ture.
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skeptical   of   the   usefulness   of   discussing   real-world   problems   in   this   way.   Their   suspicion   is 
understandable, but it is ultimately misplaced. The exercise of trying to get an integrated picture from 
diverse preferences or interests of different people does involve many complex problems in which one 
could be seriously misled in the absence of formal scrutiny. (...) In the process of discussing some 
substantive issues in social choice theory, I shall have the opportunity to consider various results which 
(...) are not easily anticipated without formal reasoning. Informal insights, important as they are, cannot 
replace the formal investigations that are needed to examine the congruity and cogency of combinations 
of values and of apparently plausible demands. (...). It is centrally important for social choice theory to 
relate formal analysis to informal and transparent examination: I have to confess that in my own case, 
this combination has, in fact, been something of an obsession, and some of the formal ideas I have been 
most concerned with (...) call simultaneously for formal investigation and for informal explication and 
accessible scrutiny.” (Sen 1998: 184)
Entitled »Complementarity of Formal Methods and Informal Reasoning«, this part of his lec-
ture suggests that the scrutiny of formalism and the richness of non-formalism are of equal impor-
tance. Unfortunately, Sen does not clarify their role in the process of knowledge creation. Certainly, 
he sees formalization as being indispensable in order to render verbal statements unambiguous. But, 
does this also imply that previously unexplored analytical knowledge can only be obtained through 
pure axiomatization? Sen shies away from a clear statement; his choice of words, however, suggests 
a certain bias toward formalism. The latter is associated with such concepts as scrutiny, congruity, 
and cogency, eventually allowing for analysis and investigation. Informal reasoning, on the other 
hand, serves examination and explication for the purpose of creating accessibility and transparency 
of the knowledge generated. 
So far, Sen seems to adopt the bias between hard and soft scientific tools common to method-
ological debates between economics and social sciences Yet, in an article published in The Journal 
of Philosophy – the discipline of the journal seems worthwhile mentioning – Sen provides an infor-
mal discussion on questions of liberty and social choice. Here, he argues that the practical impor-
tance of axiomatic results must be established through verbal interpretation, as the formal condi-
tions used in social choice theory can be given more than one interpretation and are thus far from 
being unambiguous (Sen 1983: 5).
8 As this applies to impossibility theorems derived through ax-
iomatic method in general, Sen (1987: 389) again stresses the need for complementarity: In under-
8 For a further discussion of this issue see Sen (1987: 389).
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iomatic method offers enormous scope for efficient scientific reasoning, but this efficiency will be 
self-defeating, if the substantive differences between theorems are no carefully taken into account in 
interpreting exactly the content of the results derived. »The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal« 
testifies to this claim, as the specific implications of the individual preference orderings and the 
conditions defined are illustrated through the use of an anecdotal example.
4.     Metho    dological Individualism    
During the 1870s, the marginalist revolution set the direction for economics to become an indi-
vidualist science. Explanations of economic phenomena, definitions of social concepts and the pos-
tulation of social laws, would have to be anchored on the micro level, i.e. on the level of individual 
human beings. However, methodological individualism can take different forms. It is necessary to 
know if we have to do with an ontological thesis about social reality, an epistemological thesis 
about possible knowledge, or a strictly methodological principle about the road to knowledge 
(Udehn 2002). This section argues that Sen's adaptation of methodological individualism presents 
an instance of the latter. At the same time, Sen repeatedly calls the received view of mainstream 
economic methodology on this issues into question.
The ontological context for postwar neoclassical economics was set, primarily, by Arrow and De-
breu, the main architects of general equilibrium theory, advocating a particularly strong form of 
methodological individualism (Udehn 2002). From this perspective, each individual is conceived of 
as acting in a way partly determined by psychology and physical surroundings and partly by the ac-
tions of other individuals. Given a set of exogenous and endogenous factors, the behavior of any in-
dividual can be determined (Arrow [1951] 1968: 640). Moving from the micro level to the societal 
level, social choice theory proceeds by the method of preference aggregation. In his analysis, Sen 
(1970b: 2) adopts this point of departure by asserting that individual preferences for different social 
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preference ordering of a society a function of individual preference orderings; if the latter set is 
specified, the former must be fully determined. Similarly, Sen's (1983: 8) definition of a social deci-
sion function, as determining “(...) a complete and consistent social preference defined over the set 
of alternative social states for any set (...) of individual preference orderings” embodies the scientif-
ic principle of methodological individualism. This basic assumption about the road to knowledge is 
reaffirmed by Sen in his entry on »Social Choice Theory« in Palgrave's Dictionary of Economics.
“Social choice theory, (...), is concerned with the relations between individuals and the society. In 
particular, it deals with the aggregation of individual interests, or judgments, or well-beings, into some 
aggregate notion of social welfare, social judgment, or social choice. It should be obvious that the 
aggregation exercise can take very different forms depending on exactly what is being aggregated (...) 
and what is to be derived on that basis (...). The formal similarities between these exercises in the 
analytical format of aggregation should not make us overlook the diversities in the nature of the exercises 
performed. In fact, the axioms chosen for different exercises are often quite divergent, and the general 
conception of aggregation in social choice permits such variation." (Sen 1987: 382)
Again, Sen's emphasis on the complementarity of formal axiomatization and non-formal inter-
pretation of results becomes apparent. Further, the definitions and axiomatic conditions underlying 
»The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal«, confirm Sen's commitment to a methodologically indi-
vidualist research program. First, the condition of Unrestricted Domain requires that the collective 
choice rule includes every individual preference ordering. Moreover, it requires that a collective 
choice rule must work for every logically possible configuration of individual preference orderings, 
and, in doing so, demands that the aggregation exercise be complete. Secondly, the Pareto principle 
requires that: (a) if everyone in society is indifferent between two alternatives, then the society as a 
whole should also be indifferent; and (b), if at least one individual prefers one alternative x over y, 
and every other individual regards the former to be at least as good as the latter, then society should 
prefer x over y. Hence, individual preferences should be fully represented in social choice. Thirdly, 
the condition of Minimal Liberalism, having a particularly strong individual connotation, requires 
that (at least two) individuals should have their personal preferences reflected in the social prefer-
ence ordering over one pair of alternatives each. That is, each individual should have a recognized 
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9
In view of »The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal«, Sen's adaptation of methodological indi-
vidualism can be seen as being in line with mainstream economic thought. Yet, in two aspects Sen 
appears to have an uneasy relationship with this principle. First, it is important to consider the na-
ture and role of impossibility theorems. While the method starts form a strongly individualistic 
premise, the obtained results, given a number of axiomatic conditions, ultimately specify certain 
flaws in the method of preference aggregation. Similarly, Arrow's original impossibility theorem 
seemed to imply that social appraisals and welfare economic calculations would have to be either 
inevitably arbitrary or unremediably despotic. Hence, the knowledge claims contained in impossi-
bility results should not be regarded as scientific ends themselves. Rather, they are to be seen as an-
alytical means to locate the limits between the possibility and the impossibility of social choice, i.e. 
the scope for relating social judgments and group decisions to the views of individuals forming a 
collective. Thereby, a full axiomatic determination of a particular method of social choice can be 
stated. The resulting social choice rules need to be interpreted according to the reach and the rea-
sonableness of the axioms used. “We have to get on with the basic task of obtaining workable rules 
that satisfy reasonable requirements” (Sen 1998: 185). As such, the formulation of impossibility 
theorems presents not a mere exercise in individual preference aggregation, but rather an inquiry 
into the implications of different axioms for the practicability of collective choice rules. According-
ly, Sen's usage of impossibility theorems as a scientific tool serves, not least, to expound the limita-
tions in a methodologically individualist approach.
The second aspect in which Sen diverges from mainstream economic methodology concerns 
the classical divide between methodological individualism and methodological holism. While both 
9 Formally this condition is stated as: “For each individual i, there is at least one pair of alternatives, say (x, y), such 
that if this individual prefers x to y, then then society should prefer x to y, and if this individual prefers y to x, then 
society should prefer, y to x” (Sen 1970a: 153).
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alistic premise, the introduction of the »Collective Choice and Social Welfare« monograph contains 
a particularly strong critique of methodological individualism.
“We shall find that the effectiveness of different rules of collective choice depends much on the precise 
configuration of individual preference orderings, and these configurations will, in general, reflect the 
forces that determine individual preferences in a society. Just as social choice may be based on individual 
preferences, the latter in their turn will depend on the nature of the society. Thus the appropriateness of 
alternative rules of collective choice will depend partly on the precise structure of the society. The content 
of individual preferences is also an important issue. (...) The society in which a person lives, the class to 
which he belongs, the relation that he has with the social and economic structure of the community, are 
relevant to a person's choice not merely because they affect the nature of his personal interests but also 
because they influence his value system (...).” (Sen, 1970b, 5f)
Here, Sen acknowledges that social phenomena are not fully reducible to the micro level. As in-
dividual preference-based choice is embedded in and shaped by a social context, the formation of 
preferences is subject to collective structures. A strictly individualist ontology, therefore, can only 
be misleading. How can this statement be reconciled with Sen's compliance to mainstream econom-
ic methodology, which requires social phenomena to be investigated exclusively in terms of individ-
ual aims, beliefs, attitudes, and expextations? Two explanations can be suggested. Either, Sen im-
plicitly acknowledges that social facts are simply too complex for a full reduction of them to be fea-
sible. Or he accepts, equally implicitly , that in the epistemic community of economics a method-
ologically individualist approach is required – be it out of ontological conviction or sheer pragma-
tism. Taken seriously, Sen's theoretical reflections on ontology, contrary to his application, imply 
that the demarcation line between strict definitions of methodological individualism and holims are 
being blurred (Watkins 1994: 449).
This section has argued that Sen's treatment of methodological individualism demonstrates his 
schizophrenic attitude towards mainstream economics methodology. In this regard, his contributions 
to social choice theory are effectively consistent with neoclassical welfare economics. Sen's more 
extensive publications, as well as his related writings in philosophy, however, display a profound 
frictions in his methodological character. In order to further extract Sen's tensions on this issue, it is 
useful to refer to the conclusion of the passage quoted above.
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represent an assumption that pervades much of traditional economics, but it is not a particularly useful 
model for understanding problems of social choice.” (Sen 1970b: 6)
This passages introduces Sen's distrust towards another cornerstone of mainstream economic 
reasoning: the assumption of rational behavior in individual decision-making.
5. The Rationality Postulate
Samuelson (1947: 90) noted that economics can be separated from (other) social sciences 
“upon the basis of rational or irrational behavior, where these terms are defined in the penumbra of 
utility theory”. Recently, commentators such as Blaug (1992: 230) have argued that the rationality 
postulate can be regarded as a Lakatosian hardcore of the neoclassical research program. It appears, 
Popper's ([1957] 1961) claim to treat rational behavior as one of the main methodological proposi-
tions in the social sciences is met by the discipline of economics. Sen himself, however, perceives 
the rationality postulate not as strictly dominating economic thought, but rather as being highly con-
tested. “If today you were to poll economists of different schools, you would almost certainly find 
the coexistence of beliefs (i) that rational behavior theory is unfalsifiable, (ii) that it is falsifiable 
and so far unfalsified, and (iii) that it is falsifiable and indeed patently false” (Sen 1977: 325). 
Within economics, marginalism introduced the idea that choice was determined by the maxi-
mization of a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Fisher and Pareto postulated that the 
cardinal nature of the utility function were irrelevant, only the ordering of the commodities needed 
to be specified. Samuelson (1938) introduced a change in orientation through his concept of re-
vealed preference; not an underlying ordering or a utility function, but the actual choices made by 
agents were primary.
One of the rather rare direct methodological interventions of Sen can be found in his article 
»Rational Fools«. It presents an explicit critique of rationality as postulated and employed in main-
stream economics.
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with the accuracy of answers to well-defined questions posed with preselected assumptions which 
severely constrain the nature of the models that can be admitted into the analysis. A specific concept of 
man is ingrained in the question itself, and there is no freedom to depart from this conception so long as 
one is engaged in answering this question. The nature of man in these current economic models 
continues, then, to reflect the particular formulation of certain general philosophical questions posed in 
the past. The realism of the chosen conception of man is simply not a part of this inquiry.” (Sen 1977: 
322)
The above quote exemplifies Sen's discontent with the received view on the relevance of the re-
alism of assumptions in mainstream economic theory. As put forward most prominently by Fried-
man (1953), it has been argued that the assumptions of a theory would not have to be descriptively 
realistic; instead their relevance would have to be judged based on whether they represent sufficient 
approximations to answer the questions at hand. Accordingly, Friedman acknowledged that most 
entrepreneurs certainly do not act in accordance with a strict notion of the rationality postulate, i.e. 
they do not solve the mathematical equations necessary to calculate the maximum of their expected 
returns. Rather, this mainstream view holds that their behavior can be conceptualized by resorting to 
the assumption that they are acting »as if« they were rationally maximizing their utility. Sen points 
out two problems of this perspective. First, the issue of the realism of assumptions has simply been 
excluded from methodological debates. In contradiction to Friedman's original argument, rational 
decision-making is not employed as a merely methodological principle. Instead, by not allowing for 
a discussion on realistic premises, the rationality postulate, de facto, takes on the form of seemingly 
universally valid ontological statement. Secondly, the rationality postulate – irregardless of whether 
it is used in the »as if« form or seen as an ontological truth – severely confines the scope of possible 
knowledge creation through economic inquiry. The exclusion of considerations on alternative 
modes of choosing and acting limits the process of knowledge creation – at the worst, leading to 
tautological results.
As Sen (1977: 323) puts it, rational choice approaches, by definition, start from “axiomatic 
egoism”. A person's real preferences are examined in terms of actual choices. While being internally 
consistent, this perspective does not allow for ways of understanding someone's attitude towards al-
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rational choice approach ultimately presents an instance of circular reasoning. “Behavior, it appears, 
is to be explained in terms of preferences, which are in turn defined only by behavior” (Sen 1977: 
325). Portrayed in such a way, agents can be seen as »rational« in the limited sense of showing no 
inconsistencies in their behavior. However, this approach does not create any insights to human be-
havior and choice, that are not already contained in the behavioral assumptions. “The purely eco-
nomic man”, for Sen (1977: 336) perceived only in terms of one all-purpose preference ordering, 
“is indeed close to being a social moron”. Distinctions of different types of preferences as well as 
issues of preference formation are simply ignored.
Sen's treatment of the rationality postulate presents another indication of his schizophrenia. His 
unflinching critique coincides with a highly pragmatic application of the rational choice framework 
in his own publications on social choice theory. It appears that Sen operates with two different no-
tions of rationality. His critique in »Rational Fools« (1977: 343) is based on an understanding of ra-
tional choice as the “invariable pursuit of self-interest in each act” neglecting all cases of agency 
motivated by other sentiments, for instance »commitment«.
10 In his earlier works, however, Sen em-
ploys a very different concept of rationality. This concept corresponds to Rosenberg's (1994: 391) 
assessment of economics as a branch of mathematics which operates with a technical notion of ra-
tionality, abstractly defined by a set of axioms.
Sen's impossibility result of the »Paretian Liberal« presents an instance for such a technical us-
age of the rationality postulate. Again, Sen (1970a: 153) refers to Arrow's original theorem by point-
ing out, how the so-called »Condition 1'«, "all logically possible orderings of the alternative social 
states are admissible" (Arrow 1963: 96), implies a collective rationality. Formally, this condition re-
quires that the domain of the collective choice should not be arbitrarily restricted. Further, it also 
suggests rational behavior on the part of the community. On the one hand, i.e. the aggregate level, it 
10 In this regard, Sen (1977) discusses different contributions to choice theory, such as Edgeworth's distinction between 
»sympathy«and »commitment« and Harsanyi's distinction of »ethical preferences«and »subjective preferences«.
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and then chooses in any given case that alternative which stands highest on this list. On the other 
hand, that is on the disaggregate level, it implies that individual choice is consistent with the ratio-
nality principle in the technical sense. The same implications are contained in Sen's Condition U, 
used in the »Paretian Liberal« impossibility result.
Some further considerations on rational choice can, again, be found in the »Collective Choice 
and Social Welfare« monograph. Here, Sen (1970b: 16) argues that a choice function is a precondi-
tion for rational choice: The existence of a nonempty choice set is equivalent to the existence of 
some alternative which is regarded as at least as good as every other one in the set. Defined on the 
basis of a binary preference relation, a choice function requires choosing one over the other. More-
over, Sen specifies two particular rationality conditions. In order to allow not only for choice, but a 
for a rational way of choosing one over the other, the following two properties of a choice function 
are specified by Sen (1970b: 17).
● Property α: x∈S 1⊂S2[x∈C S 2 x∈CS1] , for all x,
● Property β: [x, y∈C S 1&S1⊂S 2][x∈CS2 y∈C S 2] , for all x, y.
11
Formally, the first property α, also known as Chernoff's condition, states that if some element 
of S1 is best in S2 , then it is best in S1 . According to Sen (1970b: 17), this condition of the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a basic requirement of rational choice. It demands that 
the social welfare function provides the same ranking of preferences among a subset of options as it 
would for a complete set of options. Further, changes in individual rankings of irrelevant alterna-
tives, that is to say unavailable alternatives outside the subset, should have no impact on the societal 
ranking of the relevant subset. Property β requires that if x and y are both best in S1 , then one of 
them cannot be best in S2 without the other also being best in S2 . The remainder of the respective 
11 Here, C(S) is a choice function defined over some X, S1 is a subset of S2 .
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cussion, whether a social choice function should be required to satisfy both properties, or whether 
property α is sufficient (Sen 1970b: 16-20, 50f).
What is important here, is not the exact content of the technicalities, but rather their form and func-
tion in the argument and its presentation. As suggested above, these stand in contrast to Sen's con-
cept of rationality in his critique expressed in »Rational Fools«. In the reverse conclusion, Sen's 
treatment of rational choice in his inquiry into questions of social choice has to be regarded as being 
consistent with mainstream economic methodology.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined the intellectual origins of Amartya Sen's work on the basis of his most 
prominent contributions to welfare economics. In particular, his treatment of three of the corner-
stone of mainstream economic methodology in his publications on social choice theory have been 
scrutinized. With regard to formal and informal modes of reasoning, a joint analysis of Sen's differ-
ent publications on the »Liberal Paradox«, respectively the »Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal«, 
shows that his procedure is in accordance with his call for a complementarity of the two methods. 
While the impossibility results are obtained through strict axiomatization, extensive verbal explana-
tions serve to clarify the content and the implications contained in the axiomatic exercise. Sen's on-
tological framework to a large extent complies with mainstream economics. Especially, the method 
of individual preference aggregation, inherent to conventional social choice theory, is adopted by 
Sen without modification. However, his considerations on preference formation and on the assump-
tion that social phenomena can be explained solely on the level of the individual highlight a great 
deal of skepticism regarding a strict methodological individualism. A similar tension can be found 
in Sen's treatment of the rationality postulate. While the aggregation exercise of social choice theory 
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of the behavioral assumptions in mainstream economic reasoning.
In order to describe the apparent tensions in Sen's procedures of and considerations on scientif-
ic knowledge production, I have adopted the metaphor of methodological schizophrenia. Having an-
alyzed a particular chapter in Sen's intellectual biography, the patient has to be diagnosed positive. 
In terms of its methodology, this particular contribution of Sen to welfare economics appears con-
flictual at best and inconsistent at worst. It is safe to say, that his work in the field of social choice 
theory certainly did not reinvent economic thought. As Des Gasper (2002: 441) puts it: “He (Sen) 
proceeds in ways accessible and credible to mainstream economist, his original and main reference 
group, and retains most of their assumptions and style, thus he omits much substantive discussion of 
the content of processes of choice”. While this assessment of Sen's methodology is shared by the 
author, Des Gasper's conclusion is rejected. Throughout Sen's work on welfare economics, there is a 
continuing treatment of methodological issues, which constitutes a serious challenge to the received 
view on economic methodology. In particular, his article »Rational Fools« provides exactly the dis-
cussion Des Gasper's claims to be missing from Sen's work. On the other hand, it seems that Sen's 
main reference group, the economic profession, is not fully aware of Sen's schizophrenic condition. 
As Arrow (1999: 163) comments: “His (Sen's) exploration of the notions of social welfare takes 
place at every level of analysis, formal-mathematical, conceptual, and empirical. It is by far the 
most comprehensive study of its kind, drawing on profound understanding of both economics and 
moral philosophy”. While this assessment acknowledges the comprehensive scope of Sen's thought, 
reaffirming the view of the »compleat economist«, it also represents the general negligence of the 
serious methodological tensions inherent to his work by most mainstream economists.
It is important to bear in mind, that the diagnosis of Sen's condition provided in this paper is 
only partial. It does not account for his philosophical thought. Nor does it attempt to reconnect the 
origins of his economic reasoning with the subsequent formulation of the CA. Looking at his writ-
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lines of applied analysis and theoretical considerations. While the formulation of his impossibility 
results shows a strict coherence with the principle of reductionism, Sen's critical thought on the 
methodology of economic reasoning displays the urge to utilize a more holistic mode of knowledge 
production. A more comprehensive study of his intellectual development, allowing for a dynamic 
view of the tensions in Sen's methodology, could provide valuable insights to how Sen has evolved 
from a mainstream welfare economist to the formulation of the CA, a theoretical framework that 
can hardly be understood in terms of conventional disciplinary methodological categories.
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